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Behavioral spillovers refer to the influence that a given intervention targeting behavior
1 exerts on a subsequent, non-targeted, behavior 2, which may or may not be in the
same domain (health, finance, etc.) as one another. So, a nudge to exercise more,
for example, could lead people to eat more or less, or possibly even to give more
or less to charity depending on the nature of the spillover. But what if spillovers also
operate backward; that is, if the expectation of behavior 1 influences behavior 0 that
precedes it? For example, a person may form an intention to exercise prompted by
a policy intervention but overeat at present as a result. We define such a possibility
as a “spillunder.” In the proposed article, we critically review the few papers that we
have identified through a narrative literature review which have demonstrated spillunder
effects to date, and we propose a conceptual framework. Based on evidence about the
human mind and behavior from psychology and economics, we argue that spillunder
effects may be more common than the limited empirical findings suggest. We propose
six representative mechanisms through which the prospect of behavior 1 may impact
behavior 0: executive functions, moral licensing and moral cleansing, emotion regulation,
energization, construal level, and savoring and dread. We further discuss the policy
and practical implications of spillunder effects and examine methodological issues that
need to be considered when empirically testing these effects. As with our earlier paper
on spillovers, we aim to motivate other behavioral scientists to research behavioral
spillunders more systematically and extensively, and to prompt decision makers to
consider these effects when designing behavioral interventions.
Keywords: spillover, spillunder, policy, intervention, nudging, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Policy makers have increasingly started adopting behavioral science insights to “nudge” behaviors
ranging from energy conservation and sustainable food consumption to tax collection (Dolan et al.,
2012; Ölander and Thøgersen, 2014; Halpern, 2015). Dolan and Galizzi (2015) have argued that
transitioning to a second generation of behaviorally informed policy-making will require moving
beyond immediate behavioral eﬀects and investigating “behavioral spillovers” from one behavior
to the next (Truelove et al., 2014; Nash et al., 2017). For example, an intervention that encourages
people to donate blood may license them to subsequently display actions that are not as moral, thus
donating less to environmental charities (Blanken et al., 2015).
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But what if behavioral spillovers also operate backward; that
is, if aiming to undertake a behavior at some point in the future
inﬂuences another preceding behavior? For example, expecting
to donate blood next week may license someone to behave less
morally at present and discriminate a job candidate on a racial
basis (Cascio and Plant, 2015). We label such a “mirror image”
of behavioral spillovers as “spillunders.” This paper aims to
establish behavioral spillunders as a construct that policy makers
need to consider if they are to avoid unintended behavioral
consequences when designing policy interventions. We start
by deﬁning spillunders, after which we propose a conceptual
framework, and we overview the spillunder eﬀects that we have
identiﬁed via a narrative literature review. By examining evidence
about the human mind and behavior from the ﬁeld of behavioral
science, we then argue that spillunder eﬀects are likely to be
more pervasive than what is suggested by the limited empirical
evidence encountered through our narrative literature review.
We further discuss the relevant policy implications and examine
methodological considerations behind testing and measuring
spillunder eﬀects.
BEHAVIORAL SPILLUNDERS
Definition
Before proposing a deﬁnition of spillunders, it is useful to
recall the deﬁnition of spillovers. According to Dolan and
Galizzi (2015), the starting point of any behavioral spillover
is an intervention, which they broadly deﬁne as any policy
intervention or experimental manipulation aimed at changing or
inducing a behavior. For example, an intervention can involve
a nudge that changes behavior at an automatic level, a ﬁnancial
incentive, a persuasion technique, an experimental instruction
that informs participants to engage in certain actions, etc. Each
spillover involves an “intervention—behavior 1—behavior 2”
triplet, where behavior 1 and behavior 2 are two diﬀerent and
sequential behaviors, and where the intervention is directed at
inﬂuencing the targeted behavior 1. Behavioral spillover refers
to the eﬀect of the intervention on the subsequent, non-targeted
behavior 2 (Figure 1). The occurrence of a behavioral spillover is
assessed experimentally by comparing the quantity of behavior
2 in a group randomly assigned to the intervention relative to
a control group with no intervention (Galizzi and Whitmarsh,
2019). For example, Dolan and Galizzi (2014a) investigated how
the eﬀect of a ﬁnancial incentive (intervention) on a physical
activity (behavior 1)—stepping on a 6-inch high stepper—
spills onto subsequent eating (behavior 2). Compared to the
control condition, both high incentives (£0.10 per step) and low
incentives (£0.02 per step) signiﬁcantly increased the number of
steps participants performed. However, whereas low incentives
(vs. control) did not impact subsequent eating behavior, high
incentives increased calorie intake, thus resulting in people
consuming more calories than they burned.
In line with this conceptualization of spillovers, each
spillunder involves an “intervention—behavior 0—behavior 1”
triplet. That is, the intervention is directed at targeted behavior
1 as in the context of spillovers. The non-targeted behavior,
FIGURE 1 | A conceptual diagram of spillover and spillunder effects.
A behavioral spillover involves an “intervention—behavior 1—behavior 2”
triplet, where behavior 1 and behavior 2 are two different and sequential
behaviors, and the intervention is directed at behavior 1. The spillover
therefore refers to the effect of the intervention on the subsequent,
non-targeted behavior 2. Similarly, each spillunder involves an
“intervention—behavior 0—behavior 1” triplet. As for the spillovers, the
intervention is directed at targeted behavior 1. The non-targeted behavior,
however, is a different behavior 0 which precedes (rather than follows)
behavior 1. Behavioral spillunders thus comprise the effects that the
anticipation of some behavior 1 that was induced by the intervention has on
the preceding behavior 0. From this perspective, it is of a lesser importance
whether or not behavior 1 ever takes place after behavior 0: what really
matters is the anticipation of behavior 1 generated by different instructions
about this behavior. In that sense, it is not behavior 1 itself that influences
behavior 0, but the prospect of this behavior instigated by the intervention.
Signs + and – refer to “enhancing” and “extinguishing” spillunders respectively,
thus indicating that the prospect of some behavior 1 can either increase (+) or
decrease (–) the quantity of behavior 0 or its likelihood of occurrence.
however, is a diﬀerent behavior 0 which precedes (rather than
follows) behavior 1.1 Behavioral spillunder therefore refers to
the impact of the intervention on this preceding behavior 0
(Figure 1). For example, in Masicampo and Baumeister (2011),
all participants were told that they would need to undertake
a brainstorming task that would require them to generate as
many diﬀerent examples of a given category as possible (behavior
1). The intervention consisted of providing participants with
diﬀerent instructions concerning behavior 1: in the unfulﬁlled
goal group, they were told that they would need to list as many
examples of sea creatures as they could; in the fulﬁlled goal group,
they were given the same instructions about the sea creatures but
were also asked to form a more precise plan of how they would
accomplish the task (e.g., “When I get to the ﬁnal task, I will write
down the letters of the alphabet and will list sea creatures for each
one,” Masicampo and Baumeister, 2011, p. 676); in the control
condition, they were given broad instructions about having to
undertake a category generation task without any reference to
the speciﬁcs. Before undertaking behavior 1, all participants were
administered an anagram task (behavior 0) and asked to solve as
many as they could. The results showed that participants in the
unfulﬁlled goal group solved fewer anagrams than those in the
other two groups, presumably because the prospect of having to
generate examples of sea creatures but without having a speciﬁc
strategy that makes the task easy produced intrusive thought that
1It is important to point out that, conceptually speaking, behavior 0 can refer to
various diﬀerent behaviors that precede behavior 1 (e.g., behavior 0a, behavior
0b, etc.). Because we have, however, failed to identify any such more complex
spillunders in the literature, we refrain from further addressing them in the
present article.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1142
Krpan et al. Behavioral Spillunders
clashed with the present anagram solving. As with behavioral
spillovers, participants do not need to be consciously aware of
what links behavior 0 and behavior 1 for spillunders to take place.
Therefore, as with spillovers, our conceptualization of
spillunders naturally lends itself to imagining a longitudinal
between-subject experimental setting where participants are
randomly allocated to either a control or (at least) a treatment
group. Participants in both groups are asked to perform exactly
the same task (behavior 0). Before this task, however, they
are given diﬀerent sets of instructions (intervention) for a
subsequent behavior 1 that will take place only after behavior
0. Behavioral spillunders thus refer to the eﬀects that the
anticipation of diﬀerent behaviors 1 has on the preceding
behavior 0. From this perspective, it is of a lesser importance
whether or not behavior 1 ever takes place after behavior 0 (and
how exactly it takes place): what really matters is the anticipation
of behavior 1 generated by diﬀerent instructions about this
behavior. An alternative, but substantially corresponding, way of
conceptualizing spillunders is by imagining the same longitudinal
between-subject experimental setting described above, but
where the intervention is behavior 1 itself: participants are
randomly allocated to either the control or the treatment group;
participants in both groups perform the same task (behavior 0);
before performing the task for behavior 0, those in the treatment
group are told that another task (behavior 1) will take place
after behavior 0, whereas those in the control group are told
nothing. In such a case behavioral spillunders refer to the fact
that merely knowing that behavior 1 will follow can alter the
preceding behavior 0.
Conceptual Framework and Overview of
the Literature
Compared to the state of research on spillovers, spillunders
have been largely neglected. After conducting an extensive
narrative review of the literature over the course of 2 years,
we have identiﬁed only eight research articles that fall under
the above deﬁnition of spillunders.2 Considering this limited
empirical evidence, and the potentially diﬀerent psychological
2Considering that “spillunder” is a novel conceptualization that can be used to
describe a variety of diﬀerent behavioral phenomena (see Table 1), we could not
undertake a systematic review of the literature to detect all the articles that contain
the word ‘spillunder’ eﬀects. Our approach was therefore less systematic, and we
used a variety of diﬀerent strategies that led us to identify the eight research articles
that involve “spillunders.” First, using Google Scholar as well as the PsycINFO,
RepEC, and EconLit databases, we searched for keywords that refer to phenomena
from psychology and economics under which we thought that spillunders may
occur. These involve behavioral mechanisms such as energization, intrusive
thoughts, planning, goal activation, goal shielding, procrastination, intentions,
psychological distance, commitment, future orientation, anticipatory regret, future
thinking, savoring, dread, and similar. Then we used speciﬁc keywords which
refer to the link between present and future actions, such as “inﬂuence of future
behavior on present behavior,” “future into present,” “future impacts present,”
“future inﬂuences on present behavior,” “how future impacts present,” and similar.
Finally, we explained the concept of spillunders to our close colleagues and
collaborators and asked them to notify us if they encounter a paper that involves
research related to this or similar constructs, and we ourselves closely followed
representative psychology (e.g., Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
Psychological Science, Social Cognition, etc.) and economics (e.g., Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology, Journal
of Behavioral and Experimental Economics) journals to uncover spillunder studies
mechanisms that account for spillover relative to spillunder
eﬀects, it would be diﬃcult to classify spillunders using the
same conceptual framework that Dolan and Galizzi (2015)
developed for spillovers.
According to this framework, spillovers are divided into
“promoting,” “permitting,” and “purging” (Dolan and Galizzi,
2015). Promoting spillovers refer to all behavioral sequences in
which the ﬁrst behavior leads to another behavior that works
in the same direction. For example, if the ﬁrst behavior (e.g.,
biking to work) is positive, which means it is consistent with
an underlying motive (e.g., protecting the environment), the
second behavior (e.g., recycling) is also consistent with this
motive (Evans et al., 2013). Also, if the ﬁrst behavior (e.g.,
resting) is inconsistent with a motive (e.g., losing weight) and
thus has a negative sign, the second behavior follows the same
direction (e.g., eating a slice of cake; Cochran and Tesser,
1996). Permitting spillovers occur when undertaking a behavior
1 (e.g., lowering water use) consistent with a motive (e.g.,
protecting the environment) entitles the person to undertake
behavior 2 (e.g., increasing electricity consumption) that pushes
back against that same motive (Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). Finally,
purging spillovers occur when a person undertakes behavior
2 (e.g., donating to charity) that is driven by the motive to
repair the self-image damaged by behavior 1 (e.g., being selﬁsh;
Sachdeva et al., 2009).
There are two obstacles to implementing this classiﬁcation
system to spillunders. First, whereas for some spillunder eﬀects
behaviors 0 and 1 are clearly linked through an underlying
motive, for other spillunders a diﬀerent mechanism may be
at play. For example, when people expect to engage in a
confrontational situation that involves warning a tenant s/he has
to pay the rent (behavior 1), they are more likely to listen to
music that makes them feel angry in advance (behavior 0) because
this prepares them for the confrontation (Tamir and Ford, 2012).
This spillunder could be categorized as promoting because the
motive to collect the rent drives both behaviors to work in the
same direction. In another representative spillunder research
that we previously described (Masicampo and Baumeister, 2011),
however, the prospect of behavior 1 may impact behavior 0
through a diﬀerent mechanism: expecting to generate names
of sea creatures with vs. without a plan (behavior 1) impaired
anagram solving (behavior 0) due to creating intrusive thoughts
rather than due to strengthening or weakening a speciﬁc
motive. This spillunder, therefore, can hardly be categorized
as promoting, permitting, or purging, because an underlying
motive linking behavior 0 and behavior 1 may not exist, or
may be diﬃcult to identify. Another obstacle is that, even if
certain spillunder eﬀects can be classiﬁed under the categories
that Dolan and Galizzi (2015) established, available evidence is
not yet suﬃcient to support the existence of all the categories.
We therefore propose a simpler classiﬁcation system that is
appropriate for the current state of research on spillunders and
can be expanded into greater detail as the number of relevant
research increases. It organizes spillunders into two categories
that may have been published in the previous issues or occurred in the most
recent issues.
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TABLE 1 | Overview of empirical findings on behavioral spillunders.
Study Behavior 0 Behavior 1 Finding Spillunder Type
Masicampo and
Baumeister, 2011
Solving anagrams Generating names of sea creatures without
forming a plan (unfulfilled goal) vs. generating
names of sea creatures with forming a plan
(fulfilled goal) vs. generating names of sea
creatures with vague description of the
generation task (control)
Participants expecting to generate names
of sea creatures without forming a plan
(unfulfilled goal group) solved fewer
anagrams than those in the control group
and in the fulfilled goal group
Extinguishing
Tamir and Ford,
2012
Listening to angry music
clips
Confronting a tenant about paying the rent
vs. nurturing a healthy relationship with the
tenant (control)
Expecting to confront a tenant about paying
the rent makes people more likely to listen
to angry music than in the control group
Enhancing
Polivy et al., 1994 Eating cookies Engaging in an anxiety inducing behavior
(delivering a 2-min speech) vs. rating fabrics
on tactile dimensions (control)
Expecting to give a 2-min speech vs.
control increases cookie consumption, but
only for restrained eaters
Enhancing
Morsella et al.,
2010
Meditation Generating names of all the states of the
United States
Expecting to write down the names of all
US states made people less able to
meditate due to experiencing intrusive
thoughts
Extinguishing
Urbszat et al., 2002 Eating cookies Diet vs. no diet Expecting to start a diet immediately after
the experiment increased cookie
consumption, but only for restrained eaters
Enhancing
Kopp et al., 2015 Assessment of reading
comprehension of a
scientific text
Focusing on behaviors that participants need
to undertake after the experiment vs.
removing attention from those behaviors
(e.g., by making a list of the components of
an automobile)
Participants who were thinking about the
short-term plans they aimed to accomplish
after the experiment (vs. control) performed
worse on reading comprehension of a
scientific text
Extinguishing
Cascio and Plant,
2015
Deciding on whether to
endorse a black or a white
candidate for the position
of a new police officer
Engaging in a moral behavior (e.g., taking part
in a fundraiser or donating blood) vs. absence
of anticipated moral behavior (control)
Participants who anticipated performing a
moral action in the future were more likely
to reveal their racial prejudices and to
discriminate a job candidate on a racial
basis
Enhancing
Cody et al., 2015 Word recall task Anticipating to undertake an anxiety inducing
behavior (delivering a 5-min speech in front of
the experimenter and a video camera) vs. no
expectations to engage in anxiety inducing
behaviors (control)
Participants with social anxiety who
anticipated giving a 5-min speech falsely
recalled more anxiety-related words
compared to those in the control group
Enhancing
based on the direction of eﬀect that the expectation of behavior 1
has on behavior 0: “enhancing” spillunders are those in which the
prospect of behavior 1 increases the quantity of behavior 0 or its
likelihood of occurrence; “extinguishing” spillunders are those in
which the prospect of behavior 1 reduces the quantity of behavior
0 or its likelihood of occurrence.
Table 1 provides an overview of all the spillunder eﬀects we
identiﬁed in the behavioral science literature to date. Of the
eight spillunder eﬀects identiﬁed, three eﬀects can be classiﬁed
as extinguishing, and ﬁve as enhancing spillunders. As it can be
seen from the table, the spillunder eﬀects are spread across many
diﬀerent behavioral domains, including mental performance—
e.g., anagram solving (Masicampo and Baumeister, 2011),
reading comprehension (Kopp et al., 2015), and word recall
(Cody et al., 2015); health—e.g., food consumption (Polivy et al.,
1994; Urbszat et al., 2002) and meditation (Morsella et al., 2010);
morality—e.g., displaying racial prejudice (Cascio and Plant,
2015); and leisure—e.g., music choice (Tamir and Ford, 2012).
This variability indicates that spillunders could be relevant to
many diﬀerent policy domains if they are shown to be an integral
component of day to day activities.
To illustrate that spillunders can be more common than
the limited evidence up to date suggests, in the next section
we overview a broad range of psychological and behavioral
mechanisms thatmay account for spillunder eﬀects across diverse
situations and environments. Three of these mechanisms were
selected both because they can convincingly explain some of the
spillunder eﬀects from Table 1 (as it will be discussed in section
“Making the Case for Spillunders: Overview of Core Mechanisms
Through Which the Prospect of Behavior 1 Could Impact
Behavior 0”), and because they typically control a wide range
of everyday behaviors, thus allowing us to make speculations
about the occurrence of spillunders in everyday life. These
mechanisms involve executive functions (plausible mechanisms
that are likely behind the spillunder eﬀects documented by Polivy
et al., 1994; Morsella et al., 2010; Masicampo and Baumeister,
2011; Kopp et al., 2015); moral licensing and moral cleansing
(plausible mechanisms that can explain the spillunder eﬀects
in Urbszat et al., 2002; Cascio and Plant, 2015); and emotion
regulation (which can accounts for the spillunder eﬀect in
Tamir and Ford, 2012).3 The remaining three mechanisms—
energization, construal level, and savoring and dread—were
3For the spillunder eﬀect in Cody et al. (2015) (see Table 1 in the present article),
we did not identify a mechanism that would convincingly explain it and could be
extended to a wide range of everyday activities. This is why in Section “Making the
Case for Spillunders: Overview of Core Mechanisms ThroughWhich the Prospect
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1142
Krpan et al. Behavioral Spillunders
selected because of their implications for a variety of everyday
actions, and because the link between the present and the
future is inherently ingrained in their theorizing, thus allowing
us to make convincing arguments for their involvement in
spillunder eﬀects, even if these eﬀects have not yet been identiﬁed
within their domains.
MAKING THE CASE FOR SPILLUNDERS:
OVERVIEW OF CORE MECHANISMS
THROUGH WHICH THE PROSPECT OF
BEHAVIOR 1 COULD IMPACT
BEHAVIOR 0
Executive Functions
Executive functions refer to three broad categories of cognitive
processes—inhibition, working memory, and cognitive ﬂexibility
(Diamond, 2013)—that are at the core of any behavior that is
eﬀortful and does not come spontaneously, ranging from exercise
(Hagger et al., 2010) to healthy eating (Hofmann et al., 2012),
and solving intellectual tasks (Mrazek et al., 2013). Inhibition
comprises functions such as self-control that regulate control
of attention, thoughts, behavior, or emotions, and are necessary
for resisting temptations, maintaining the focus of attention,
overcoming habits, and persisting on any eﬀortful physical or
intellectual tasks (Diamond, 2013). Working memory is the
capacity to hold information in one’s consciousness and actively
work with the information during problem solving (Engle, 2002).
Cognitive ﬂexibility allows one to look at a problem from
many diﬀerent perspectives, using diﬀerent strategies to solve
the problem, and adjusting to new situational demands and
requirements to ﬁnd the solution (Diamond, 2013). Without
executive functions, humans would be at the mercy of their
impulses and habits and would not be able to undertake any
activities that require focus and eﬀort.
Executive functions are highly susceptible to situational
inﬂuences, and can be disrupted or enhanced by a variety of
factors—including stress, anxiety, intrusive thoughts, cognitive
load, mood, stereotype threat, mindfulness, mortality salience,
and so on—which can in turn impair or enhance a variety
of everyday behaviors (Sorg and Whitney, 1992; Ashcraft and
Kirk, 2001; Klein and Boals, 2001; Hofmann et al., 2008, 2012;
Johns et al., 2008; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Mrazek et al.,
2013). Based on this notion, it would be expected that a large
proportion of spillunder eﬀects occur via the inﬂuence of a
prospective behavior 1 on executive functioning. In fact, the
largest number of spillunders we identiﬁed in Table 1 can be
explained by the impairment of executive functions caused by
the expectation of behavior 1. For example, in Polivy et al.
(1994), restrained eaters ate more cookies when anticipating
an anxiety-inducing (vs. neutral) behavior because anxiety
undermined their self-control, and the impulsive tendencies to
indulge took over as a result. Moreover, in Kopp et al. (2015),
of Behavior 1 Could Impact Behavior 0” we do not discuss this eﬀect in relation to
one of the mechanisms.
focusing on behaviors participants were aiming to undertake after
the experiment (vs. removing attention from these behaviors)
likely evoked intrusive thoughts which interfered with their
reading comprehension. A similar mechanism was at play in
Masicampo and Baumeister (2011). Finally, in Morsella et al.
(2010), intrusive thoughts activated by the prospect of having
to recall the names of all US states interfered with their
ability to meditate.
Moral Licensing and Moral Cleansing
Moral licensing refers to people’s propensity to undertake an
action that is less virtuous or less beneﬁcial for their health
after they have previously engaged in a morally desirable or a
healthy behavior (Merritt et al., 2010). For example, purchasing
an electric car may inﬂuence people to feel less obliged to act
environmentally friendly compared to purchasing a conventional
gas car (Klöckner et al., 2013). In contrast, moral cleansing is
the propensity to engage in a morally desirable or a healthy
behavior after undertaking actions that are less virtuous or
healthy to restore the moral balance (West and Zhong, 2015).
For example, when people think of the negative aspects of their
personality or recall immoral actions from the past, they are
more likely to donate money to charity (Sachdeva et al., 2009).
Moral licensing and cleansing have been identiﬁed in a variety
of domains ranging from pro-environmentalism (e.g., Tiefenbeck
et al., 2013; Truelove et al., 2014) to health (Chiou et al., 2011),
and research has established they are pervasive in everyday life
(Merritt et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2014; Truelove et al., 2014;
Blanken et al., 2015).
Moral licensing and cleansing are considered examples of
“permitting” and “purging” behavioral spillovers, respectively,
because their deﬁnition implies that some morally relevant
behavior 1 increases or decreases the likelihood of a subsequent
moral action (Dolan and Galizzi, 2015). Research has, however,
shown that moral licensing and cleansing can also operate
backward in accordance with our deﬁnition of spillunders. As can
be seen in Table 1, the research on the inﬂuence of expecting to
undertake a moral action in the future (behavior 1) on present
racial discrimination (behavior 0; Cascio and Plant, 2015) is an
example of a moral licensing spillunder. Another example of
this spillunder from Table 1 is the impact of expected future
dieting (behavior 1) on present cookie consumption (behavior 0;
Urbszat et al., 2002). These ﬁndings indicate that moral licensing
and cleaning may be one of the mechanisms that account
for spillunder eﬀects. Future research will need to establish
whether spillunders of moral behavior are as common as their
spillover counterparts.
Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation comprises diﬀerent strategies through which
people “inﬂuence which emotions they have, when they have
them, and how they experience and express them” (Gross,
1998, p. 272). People regulate their emotions for a variety of
reasons and in a variety of situations they encounter on a daily
basis, and they generally try to regulate negative emotions more
frequently than positive ones (Gross et al., 2006; Gross, 2014,
2015). Examples of emotion regulation include trying to calm
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1142
Krpan et al. Behavioral Spillunders
oneself down when feeling angry, ﬁring oneself up before a
competitive event, or suppressing crying at a funeral (Gross and
John, 2003; Gross, 2015).
There are 5 diﬀerent strategies people use to regulate their
emotions: (i) selection of the situation; (ii) modiﬁcation of
the situation; (iii) deployment of attention; (iv) change of
cognitions; and (v) modulation of responses (Gross, 1998). The
ﬁrst two strategies are of particular interest here because of their
compatibility with spillunder eﬀects. Selection of the situation
refers to “approaching or avoiding certain people, places, or
objects in order to regulate emotions,” whereas modiﬁcation of
the situation comprises “active eﬀorts to directly modify the
situation so as to alter its emotional impact” (Gross, 1998, p. 283).
An example of situation selection would be avoiding places where
one is likely to meet a person one dislikes, whereas skipping a
sad scene in a movie to avoid feeling negative is an example of
situation modiﬁcation (Aspinwall and Taylor, 1997; Gross, 2015;
Livingstone and Isaacowitz, 2015).
Research showed that situational strategies of emotion
regulation can result in spillunder eﬀects: expecting to undertake
some behavior 1 that can beneﬁt from a speciﬁc emotional state
may inﬂuence the person to undertake actions that potentiate
that state at present. In an example outlined in Table 1,
participants chose to listen to angry music (behavior 0) before
confronting a tenant about paying the rent (behavior 1) because
being angry makes confronting other people easier and less
intimidating (Tamir and Ford, 2012). Such emotion regulation
strategies in which behavior 0 is used to create or modify a
situation to evoke emotions that beneﬁt behavior 1 may be
common in performance-related or confrontational contexts
(e.g., sports, stock trading, or debt collection) that involve intense
emotional states (Sutton, 1991; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012;
Lane et al., 2012).
Energization
Energization, which is a synonym for physiological activation of
the body, is typically used as an objective measure of motivation
in behavioral literature and is assessed via cardiovascular
reactivity indicators such as systolic blood pressure or heart
rate (Brehm and Self, 1989; Wright and Kirby, 2001; Wright,
2008; Gendolla et al., 2012). Cardiovascular processes are
controlled by the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous
systems and therefore encompass motivational states directed
at either physical or intellectual endeavors (Obrist, 1976, 1981;
Wright and Kirby, 2001; Segerstrom and Nes, 2007; Gendolla
and Richter, 2010). Energization levels usually increase when
people perform challenging but feasible activities (Gendolla and
Richter, 2010). For example, people’s systolic blood pressure rose
as the diﬃculty of a task that required them to memorize random
letter strings increased, but systolic blood pressure dropped when
the task became impossible (Richter et al., 2008). Energy levels
are, however, not elevated only while people are undertaking
challenging activities, but even when they anticipate engaging in
such activities (Wright et al., 1986). For example, when people
merely anticipated undertaking a memory task, their systolic
blood pressure decreased if the task was easy compared to diﬃcult
(Contrada et al., 1984; Wright et al., 1986).
Important for spillunders, research evidence suggests that
energization incited by one activity can inﬂuence behavior toward
other unrelated activities, given that increased energy levels
generally make a person more likely to act and more capable
of pursuing demanding physical and intellectual endeavors
(Wright, 2008). For example, Sevincer et al. (2014) told
participants they would need to perform an intellectually
demanding task (e.g., solving an IQ test) and instructed them to
mentally contrast their desired performance on this task with the
obstacles to achieving the desired performance level (vs. control:
absence of mental contrasting). The intervention increased their
systolic blood pressure. As a result, when all participants were
eventually told they would not need to perform the intellectual
task and were given a replacement task instead (e.g., squeezing a
handgrip or writing a letter to a friend who is recovering from
a car injury in the hospital), those in the mental contrasting (vs.
control) condition did better on the replacement tasks.
These insights suggest that expecting to perform some
eﬀortful behavior 1 may elevate people’s energy levels and thus
create various spillunder eﬀects, depending on the context in
which behavior 0 is taking place. If people are in the presence of
“positive” opportunities for action (e.g., exercising or donating to
charity), these spillunders may have desirable consequences (e.g.,
burning more calories while exercising or increased charitable
donations). In contrast, if people are in the presence of negative
opportunities for action (e.g., eating hedonic foods, spending
electricity), the outcomes of spillunders may be undesirable (e.g.,
consuming more calories, increased energy use).
Construal Level
According to construal level theory, humans can mentally
represent the physical world and situations in two ways—using
abstract (e.g., seeing the forest) and concrete (e.g., seeing the
trees) construals (Trope and Liberman, 2010). For example, one
can think of a vacation very concretely, in terms of speciﬁc
activities, or abstractly, in terms of having a good time but
without focusing on the details. The abstract construal is also
known as high construal level, and the concrete construal as
low construal level. Evidence indicates that the level of construal
people use to mentally represent a stimulus (e.g., a situation
or a physical object) is determined by psychological distance
of the stimulus—the degree to which it is physically, socially,
temporally, or probabilistically distant (Bar-Anan et al., 2006;
Liberman et al., 2007; Trope and Liberman, 2010). For example,
people automatically think about a place that is far away, a
situation that will happen in a distant future, a person who is not
close to them, or an event that has a low chance of occurring using
abstract language (high construal level). In contrast, they think
about a place that is nearby, a situation expected to happen soon,
a person who is close to them, or an event highly likely to occur
using concrete language (low construal level).
Importantly for spillunders, a high or low construal level
mindset can be situationally induced and inﬂuence a variety of
diﬀerent behaviors: ﬁndings generally show that low (vs. high)
construals potentiate impulsive behaviors by triggering present
bias (Trope et al., 2007). For example, in Fujita and Han (2009)
people were presented with a list of 40 words (e.g., dog) and asked
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to either generate exemplars of these words (e.g., poodle), which
induced low construal level, or categories to which the words
belong (e.g., animal), which induced high construal level. People
in the state of low construal level were subsequently more likely
to choose a chocolate bar over an apple. Inducing low (vs. high)
construal level had a similar eﬀect on other related behaviors such
as smoking (Chiou et al., 2013), or preference for immediate over
delayed outcomes (Fujita et al., 2006).
Although researchers have not yet investigated construal level
theory in the context of spillunders, the research we reviewed
in relation to the theory suggests that diﬀerent interventions
directed at behavior 1 could induce a low or high construal
level mindset, thus impacting behavior 0 in accordance with this
mindset. For example, if an intervention inﬂuences the person
to think about behavior 1 using concrete construals, this could
evoke a low construal level mindset and make the person less
likely to avoid temptations at present. Moreover, if a behavior 1
is temporally close or an intervention makes it seem close, this
can as well instigate a low construal level mindset and make the
person more likely to act impulsively at present. Overall, each
behavior 1 involves a certain element of psychological distance
and can therefore incite low or high construal level (Trope
and Liberman, 2010), which could in turn impact numerous
behaviors relevant to health and wellbeing.
Savoring and Dread
A small literature to date in behavioral economics has focused
on accounting for instances where decision-making violates the
standard assumption of positive discounting. Loewenstein (1987)
is arguably the ﬁrst behavioral economist to explicitly posit that
the “anticipation of the future has an impact on immediate
well-being” (p. 666). Earlier arguments in this direction were
made by Wolf (1970), who discussed utility from memory and
its implications for intertemporal choice, and by Pope (1983),
who discussed the role of anticipation in risk aversion. Actually,
Loewenstein (1987) traces back this same idea to Bentham
(1789), for whom “anticipation, like consumption itself, was an
important source of pleasure and pain” (p. 666); and to Jevons
(1905), who argued that “three distinct ways are recognizable
in which pleasurable or painful feelings are caused: (i) by the
memory of past events; (ii) by the sensation of present events; (iii)
by the anticipation of future events” (p. 3). Loewenstein (1987)
shows some evidence from undergraduates (n = 30) who were
asked their maximum willingness to pay to obtain a kiss from the
movie star of their choices, or to avoid receiving a (non-lethal)
110 volts shock, with ﬁve diﬀerent time delays, spanning from
immediately (no delay) to 10 years in the future. Participants
were willing to pay, on average, more to experience a kiss delayed
by 3 days than an immediate kiss or one kiss delayed by 3 h or
1 day. The same participants were willing to pay, on average,
more to avoid a shock that was delayed for 3 h to 3 days than
to avoid an immediate shock. Loewenstein (1987) call “savoring”
the ﬁrst eﬀect, that is the “anticipal pleasure” and positive
utility derived from the anticipation of future consumption; and
“dread” the second eﬀect, that is the “anticipal pain” and negative
utility derived from the contemplation of the future. Both eﬀects
cannot be explained by positive discounting, which postulates
that people would prefer to consume desired outcomes as soon
as possible and would prefer to delay undesirable outcomes as
late as possible.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1991, 1993) relate the discussion on
negative time preferences to the parallel literature on evaluating
sequences of outcomes versus evaluating single outcomes.
Kahneman et al. (1993), for example, found that participants
strongly preferred brief sequences of decreasing discomfort
even at the cost of experiencing more discomfort overall.
Further evidence of preferences for improving sequences has
been provided by Hsee et al. (1991) for improving sequences
of relative satisfaction; Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) for
increasing 5-year salary proﬁles; Ross and Simonson (1991)
for happy-ending experiences; Frank and Hutchens (1993) for
rising wages and consumption; Loewenstein and Prelec (1993)
for increasing sequences of outcomes; and Chapman (2000)
for improving sequences of health outcomes. Loewenstein and
Prelec (1991) observe that preferences for improving sequences
can be explained in part by savoring and dread: for gains,
improving sequences allow the decision maker to savor the best
outcome until the end of the sequence, while for losses, getting
the worst outcome immediately quickly eliminates dread. Loss
aversion and adaptation can also in part explain preferences
for improving sequences: over time, in fact, people tend to
assimilate to ongoing stimuli and to evaluate new stimuli relative
to their assimilation level so that changes in consumption, rather
than levels of consumption, are the key driver of utility. While
declining sequences provide a series of relative losses, improving
sequences allow the decision makers to experience a continual
series of positive gains from their adaptation levels. Sequences of
outcomes which decline in value would thus be disliked, which
indicates negative time preferences.
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) discuss nine reasons why
people may care about the proﬁle of a sequence of events. Three
reasons justify preferences for increasing sequences; three reasons
justify preferences for declining sequences; and three reasons
justify preferences for ﬂat sequences which spread consumption
equally across time. The three reasons for preferring improving
sequences are: (i) anticipatory utility: delaying good outcomes
extends the period over which those outcomes can be pleasurably
savored, while accelerating bad outcomes reduces the period
of dread; (ii) contrast effects: delaying consumption to future
periods allows the decision makers to enjoy a series of gains
relative to their “adaptation level”; (iii) extrapolation: people
may consciously or unconsciously transform the presented
sequence into corresponding longer sequences (for example,
the sequence 2, 3, 4 can be preferred to 4, 3, 2 because
those sequences are reinterpreted as 2, 3, 4, 5. . . and 4, 3, 2,
1. . . , respectively). The three reasons for preferring declining
sequences are the same reasons for showing positive discounting
and are: (i) uncertainty about future outcomes; (ii) opportunity
costs from delaying outcomes which could have been proﬁtably
invested; and (iii) pure time preferences: genuinely caring less
about utility from later periods. Finally, the three reasons for
preferring ﬂat sequences are: (i) diminishing marginal utility from
consumption; (ii) desire for equality among temporal “selves”
(Frederick, 2003); and (iii) “divide-equally” heuristic: allocating
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consumption among multiple periods could, consciously or
unconsciously, evoke the idea of distributional equity and thus
favor ﬂat sequences (Harris and Joyce, 1980; Allison andMessick,
1990; Messick, 1993; Roch et al., 2000).
The possibility of savoring and dread is highly relevant for
spillunders, since it implies that people derive utility not just
from the current consumption of outcomes (behavior 0), but also
from the anticipation of future outcomes (behavior 1): in many
instances, the mere expectation of future outcomes (behavior 1)
can aﬀect the current behavior (behavior 0) through savoring
or dread channels.
How Widespread Are Spillunders?
Summing Up “the Big Picture”
Our overview of the six widely prevalent behavioral
mechanisms—executive functions, moral licensing or cleansing,
emotion regulation, energization, construal level, and savoring
and dread—indicates that the prospect of behavior 1 could
potentially inﬂuence behavior 0 through many diﬀerent routes
to create spillunders. Indeed, these mechanisms shape a large
proportion of everyday actions, ranging from exercise and
healthy eating to pro-environmental behavior and various
intellectual and moral pursuits. In fact, it would be diﬃcult to
identify more than a few activities that are not at least to some
degree controlled by one or more of these mechanisms. Given
the lack of research evidence on spillunders, we cannot currently
determine with certainty how frequently spillunder eﬀects occur
in everyday life via these mechanisms. Our argumentation,
however, suggests that even if the six overviewed mechanisms
create spillunder eﬀects in few instances, these eﬀects may
be more prevalent in day to day living than the limited
evidence we identiﬁed suggests. Their under-representation
in the literature therefore likely reﬂects the lack of eﬀort to
systematically study the phenomenon rather than its irrelevance
in shaping human actions.
FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
TO POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Spillunders have implications for any policy directed at
behaviors that involve future anticipation. Whereas some policy
interventions primarily concern one-oﬀ decisions that will not
require any future input from the person (e.g., making decision
about organ donation while acquiring the driving license;
Johnson and Goldstein, 2003), other interventions aﬀect more
complex behaviors that require planning. For example, when
people who have not yet paid their taxes receive a government
letter that nudges them to pay the tax (Halpern, 2015), they
need to decide when in the future to make the payment (e.g.,
on the same day, in the upcoming week, etc.). Other examples
involve policies that encourage healthy lifestyle (e.g., people need
to plan when to exercise or eat the healthy foods they purchased
in the supermarket; Kahn et al., 2002; Story et al., 2008), or pro-
environmental behavior (e.g., people need to plan time of the
day when they will reduce their energy use; Schultz et al., 2007),
and many others.
Any policy intervention directed at behaviors that are
not undertaken immediately when the person encounters the
intervention can therefore create spillunder eﬀects. In this
section, we discuss policy implications of each of the six main
behavioral mechanisms that drive the impact of some anticipated
behavior 1 on behavior 0. We start with moral licensing (Merritt
et al., 2010). Spillunders that propagate through this mechanism
are relevant to policy interventions that encourage morally
responsible or healthy behaviors (Blanken et al., 2015). As can
be inferred from previous research (e.g., Chiou et al., 2011;
Tiefenbeck et al., 2013; Hofmann et al., 2014; Cascio and
Plant, 2015), inﬂuencing people to commit to blood donation,
volunteering, energy saving, healthy eating, exercising, and
similar behaviors 1 in the future can backﬁre at present and
have an undesirable impact on behaviors 0 linked to health,
pro-environmentalism, charitable giving, prejudice, and so on.
For example, a policy intervention that makes people more
likely to plan a gym visit might also make them more likely
to eat unhealthy products at present (Werle et al., 2011). To
create eﬀective policies, policy makers will therefore need to test
which interventions can change behaviors 1 in the moral domain
without instigating moral licensing spillunders.
Two spillunder mechanisms—executive functions (Diamond,
2013) and energization (Wright, 2008)—are relevant to any
policy interventions linked to eﬀortful behaviors that require
persistence and self-control. A policy that provokes aﬀective
reactions to behavior 1 (e.g., overexcitement, anxiety, etc.) can
impair executive functions and thus hinder positive behaviors
0 such as intellectual problem solving or energy saving (Hagger
et al., 2010; Diamond, 2013), even if it eventually impacts
the targeted behavior 1 as planned. For example, Fryer et al.
(2012) showed that incentivizing teachers in advance to increase
student achievement, assuming they would need to return
the money if the students do not eventually improve (“loss
incentive”), increased math scores compared to the traditional
incentives paid upon the improved performance. Regardless
of this encouraging outcome, psychology research showed
that motivational strategies based on avoidance of losses can
evoke anxiety and impair executive functions (Roskes et al.,
2014). It is therefore a realistic possibility the loss incentive
not only motivated teachers to increase student achievement
(Fryer et al., 2012), but also backﬁred in other domains not
evaluated in the experiment. In contrast to policy interventions
that impair executive functions, the interventions that lead to
energization—for example, by making the person committed to
pursue some activating behavior 1 such as exercising or studying
for school exams—can produce either desirable or undesirable
spillunders, depending on which behaviors 0 the environment
aﬀords (Wright, 2008). This spillunder mechanism poses a future
challenge that policy makers will need to resolve: How to build
interventions that propel eﬀortful future activities but without
backﬁring in a present environment regardless of the action
opportunities it provides?
Construal level has implications for any policies targeting
future actions because any future behavior that a person
considers or anticipates can be mentally construed either
concretely (low construal level) or abstractly (high construal level;
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Trope and Liberman, 2010). People are more likely to eventually
undertake a future behavior construed concretely rather than
abstractly (Liberman et al., 2007), and some of the most eﬀective
intervention strategies rely on making a targeted behavior as
concrete as possible. For example, forming an implementation
intention to exercise, save energy, study, or eat healthily
involves formulating a plan concerning how, where, and when
to undertake these activities, which eventually increases their
likelihood (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006; Prestwich et al., 2015).
In another related line of research, participants who were shown a
computer-generated older version of themselves were more likely
to save for pension because the intervention made the old age
more concrete (Hershﬁeld et al., 2011). Although low construal
level can be beneﬁcial when building eﬀective interventions
that target behavior 1, it may also backﬁre for behavior 0,
considering that concrete mind-sets increase the likelihood of
acting impulsively (Fujita et al., 2006; Fujita and Han, 2009).
It is therefore crucial to investigate more comprehensively
how policy interventions that change construal level impact
diﬀerent behaviors 0 and explore how such interventions could
be designed to avoid propelling impulsive present actions.
Similarly, savoring and dread imply that people derive utility
not only from the current consumption of outcomes, but also
from the anticipation of future outcomes. Because the overall
utility at any point in time is the sum of the utility from current
consumption, plus the utility from the anticipation of future
consumption, it may be the case that the mere expectation of
future outcomes (behavior 1) would aﬀect the current behavior
(behavior 0), for example by reducing the current consumption.
Therefore, any policy which aims at inﬂuencing future behavior
needs to factor in all the ramiﬁcations and the changes in the
current behavior triggered by the anticipation of the future, for
example in terms of savoring the future positive outcomes or
dreading the future negative outcomes. This can have major
consequences for the assessment of the overall impact of an
envisaged policy intervention, especially if the ultimate goal
of a policy intervention is the overall individual wellbeing
or social welfare, rather than a narrowly deﬁned behavioral
outcomes. Given that the overall individual wellbeing is the
integral over time of the instantaneous wellbeing experiences
(Dolan, 2014), it is imperative that the design of behavioral
interventions systematically and comprehensively capture all
the spillunder eﬀects associated to the present anticipation of
future outcomes.
The ﬁnal spillunder mechanism—emotion regulation—is
relevant to policy contexts where the choice of some behavior 0
may be used as a strategy to propel emotional states that prepare
people for behavior 1 (Tamir and Ford, 2012; Gross, 2014, 2015).
For example, if behavior 1 involves using less electricity during
a particular time of the day, people may undertake a behavior 0
that will make them calm and serene, so they are subsequently not
tempted to engage in activities that require energy consumption.
Or, if behavior 1 involves donating blood, people may undertake
behaviors 0 that make them feel more powerful and less fearful,
so they do not experience the act of donating blood as highly
unpleasant. In this regard, the extent to which a policy directed
at behavior 1 will prompt undesirable or desirable spillunders
will depend on whether it propels positive or negative emotion
regulation strategies. Positive emotion regulation strategies may
involve activities such as mindfulness, listening to music one
enjoys, socializing with friends, etc., whereas negative emotion
regulation strategies may involve unhealthy eating, impulsive
shopping behavior, etc. (Tugade and Fredrickson, 2007; Aldao
et al., 2010; Webb et al., 2012; Gross, 2014). Understanding
how to design policies that are grounded upon positive emotion
regulation strategies will require researchers to dig beyond
the existing knowledge on the role of emotion regulation in
spillunder eﬀects.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
All research that has looked at behavioral spillunders so far (see
Table 1) has been conducted in artiﬁcial lab settings. This may
be one of the primary limitations of applying the concept of
spillunder in policy making contexts: even if human behavior
in the lab and in the ﬁeld sometimes tend to be aligned, what
happens in the lab does not always correspond to what happens
in the real world (Mitchell, 2012; Alm et al., 2015; Galizzi and
Navarro-Martínez, 2018). Moreover, lab experiments typically
suﬀer from the limitation that participants know that they are
part of an experiment, which in itself can alter the very behavior
one is interested to investigate. An alternative is to test behavioral
spillunders in “natural ﬁeld experiments,” that is, in ﬁeld settings
where participants are not even aware that they are part of an
experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). Investigating behavioral
spillunders in the ﬁeld, however, poses several challenges. First,
whereas ﬁeld experiments are designed to test the impact of an
intervention on behavior 1, measuring some other preceding
behavior 0 may be diﬃcult because the experimenter does
not always know whether and where the person may engage
in that behavior. Second, even if the experimenter is aware
where the behavior would take place, recording it may not be
possible in practice.
To overcome these limitations, here we propose some
suggestions for how spillunders could be measured in a more
ecologically valid way to inform policy making. The ﬁrst solution
is to conduct “lab-ﬁeld experiments” (Dolan and Galizzi, 2014b;
Galizzi, 2017), that, as the name suggests, contain the elements
of both lab and natural ﬁeld experiments because they combine a
stage where participants are observed in the lab and another stage
where they are followed up over time in a natural setting while
they are not aware of being observed. For example, Galizzi and
Navarro-Martínez (2018) elicited social preferences in a variety
of experimental games that participants completed in the lab.
Participants were then invited to the lab on the next day to
do a task that was not related to social preferences. After they
exited the lab, they were faced with a natural ﬁeld situation
where they could demonstrate prosocial behavior (e.g., donating
to charity, helping people), and, unbeknownst to them, their
behavior was recorded.
Similar paradigms could be implemented to study spillunders.
For example, imagine that one wants to investigate whether an
intervention directed at physical activity (behavior 1) inﬂuences
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people’s donation to environmental charity (behavior 0). In that
case, participants could ﬁrst be invited to the lab to ﬁll in a
survey about their exercise behavior, and subsequently half of
participants could receive an intervention that encourages them
to behave physically active in the upcoming week (e.g., going
to the gym, outdoor running). Then, after they exit the lab,
all participants could encounter a natural situation where an
environmental charity collects money—the amount of money
donated would then be used as the dependent variable to test
the spillunder eﬀect. Additionally, researchers could also assess
participants’ physical activity behavior in the upcoming week
either through self-reports or through a more objective measure
(e.g., Fitbit activity monitor; Takacs et al., 2014). This would allow
examining not only whether intervention directed at behavior
1 impacts behavior 0, but also whether the two behaviors are
eventually related.
An alternative approach could allow for the integration of
behavioral science experiments with other longitudinal data. In
particular, the Internet of Things (IoT; Swan, 2012) refers to
the ecosystem that consists of all objects that can be connected
to the Internet and generate data (Swan, 2012; Madakam et al.,
2015). Some of the most obvious such objects are smartphones,
laptops, and tablets, but in today’s digital age an enormous
number of other objects also constitute IoT, including cars,
household appliances, speakers such as Amazon Echo or Google
Home, watches, etc. (Swan, 2012; Hiremath et al., 2014; Zanella
et al., 2014). Almost everything can be potentially connected,
and in principle people’s behavior can be continuously tracked
and measured in many ways through the devices they use, their
social media activities, and other online, mobile, and oﬄine data
sources (e.g., Kosinski et al., 2015).
In fact, in policy domains like health, which are typically
data-rich, there is a growing interest in “behavioral data linking,”
that is, in the linkage and integration of behavioral experiments
with all sources of longitudinal smart data, such as hospital and
electronic medical records, administrative registers, biomarkers
banks, mobile devices, apps, scan data, and online panels (Galizzi
et al., 2017; Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018). These same technological
advances for the ﬁrst time in history aﬀord the measurement
of complex behavioral patterns, such as the long-term eﬀects or
spillover and spillunder eﬀects of behavioral interventions. For
example, if all administrative records were linked together for the
same individual, when policy makers send letters with diﬀerent
interventionmessages that encourage tax payment to people (e.g.,
Halpern, 2015), they could potentially track the behavior of these
same people in other policy contexts between the times they
receive the letter and the time they submit the payment (e.g.,
Alzantot and Youssef, 2012; Wilson et al., 2012; Wang et al.,
2014). Using this approach, it would be possible to determine
which behaviors 0 participants are more likely to change as a
result of themessages targeting behavior 1, as well as the direction
and the magnitude of these behavioral changes.
The main obstacle to this approach is an ethical one:
it is imperative to ensure that companies and organizations
providing the data have obtained the general consent from
participants for these data to be used for research purposes,
and that the data are securely protected to avoid misuse by
third parties (Sugiura et al., 2017; Baldini et al., 2018). Current
developments in data protection regulation, however, such as
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) developed
by the European Union, for example, have made the process
of providing consent in such circumstances more compelling
and transparent (Chassang, 2017). These and other similar
developments in the legal and institutional framework may
potentially increase the privacy, conﬁdentiality, safety, and
ethicality of sharing data for research purposes, and therefore
enhance the potential opportunities to link online, mobile, and
other longitudinal data to behavioral experiments in order to
systematically investigate phenomena such as long-term eﬀects,
spillovers, and spillunders of behavioral interventions (Galizzi,
2017; Alter and Gonzalez, 2018). We therefore encourage
researchers and practitioners to examine diﬀerent legal, logistical,
and organizational solutions and share best practices to design
and implement ethically sound experiments linked with smart
data when systematically testing real-world spillunder eﬀects and
their policy implications.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a deﬁnition of spillunders as the mirror image
of behavioral spillovers. Spillunders are spillovers operating
backward: the expectation of behavior 1 inﬂuences behavior
0 that precedes it. We have critically reviewed the few
papers identiﬁed via the narrative literature review that have
demonstrated spillunder eﬀects to date and we have proposed
a simple conceptual framework. Based on the evidence about
moral licensing and moral cleansing, emotion regulation,
energization, executive functions, construal level, and negative
time preferences, we have argued that spillunder eﬀects are
likely to be more widespread than the examples that we have
uncovered via our narrative literature review indicate. We have
discussed their policy and practical implications. We have also
examined methodological challenges that need to be considered
when empirically testing for spillunder eﬀects. As with our
earlier paper on spillovers, we aim to motivate other behavioral
scientists to research behavioral spillunders more systematically
and extensively, and to prompt decision makers to consider these
eﬀects when designing behavioral interventions.
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